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A Summary: Some Attributes of the Post-War
Decade
T
HE era of post-war expansion came to an abrupt end with the
dramatic stock market collapse of 1929, a collapse which was
a phase of a world-wide recession. It is with a perspective set by
the depression which followed that we have reviewed the events of
this period. The treatment has been restricted to certain limited
aspects of a many-sided growth. No attempt has been made to de-
velop a simple theme, or to interpret these complex events in terms
of one or two factors alone. We have followed certain threads of
change, and have defined as accurately as possible some of the ten-
dencies prevailing during a period which, in retrospect, has already
taken on some of the aspects of a golden age. This has been done
with the conviction that such definition of tendencies is not only
prerequisite to an attack upon the complicated problems raised by
the depression itself, but is, as well, essential to a systematic chart-
ing of the course of our economic development during the longer
future that lies beyond the depression.
There remains the task of preparing a brief resumé of certain
the conditions and tendencies which have been separately treated
in the detailed presentation.
Retardation of Population Growth.In any general survey of
the economic trends of a period, the growth of population fur-
a yard-stick for the appraisal of changes in other economic
elements. Changes in the pace of population growth occur slowly
and inconspicuously. The forces that bring them about are often
obscure, and difficult to define. Yet such changes affect economic
processes in innumerable ways. In their wide ramificatjons they
may determine the tone of a whole epoch.
One of the least dramatic and yet one of the most profound of
the differences between the pre-war and post-war eras in the United
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States is found in the varying rates of population growth. A change
from a cumulative growth rate of 2.0 per cent a year to 1.4 per cent
a year is a very substantial one indeed, for an element as stable in its
behavior as is the population of a country of one hundred million
inhabitants. The full effects of this retardation, and of the altered
age-group constitution of the population which will result from it,
will be felt in the years ahead of us. Yet the change was not without
significance for the period just past. The basic standard against
which the growth of many other economic elements must be mea-
sured was altered, and our interpretation of changes in these other
elements must be correspondingly modified.
Productive Processes.The distinctive post-war changes in the
field of production represented a speeding up of tendencies already
in evidence before the war. Certain novel features there were, but
in the main the lines of subsequent development are clearly apparent
in the earlier period.
Between the depressions which bounded the decade of the
'twenties the rate of increase in the physical volume of production
in the United States was clearly in excess of that which pre-
vailed during the period of expansion prior to the World War.
This is true in absolute terms. (Pre-war and post-war rates of pro-
duction growth, excluding construction, were, respectively, 3.1 per
cent per year, and 3.8 per cent.) It is more conspicuously true if
account be taken of the post-war retardation of population growth.
(Per capita of the population, pre-war and post-war rates of ad-
vance in production were, respectively, 1.1 per cent and 2.4 per cent
per year.) Relatively to the basic needs of the population, the volume
of goods of all sorts produced in the United States was being in-
creased between 1922 and 1929 at a rate probably never before
maintained for a similar period of time. The technique of physical
production had reached a higher development than at any other
time in our history.
Evidence to support this statement is found in the record of in-
dustrial productivity. During the fifteen years from 1899 to 1914
there was a notable advance in output per wage-earner in manii-
facturing .establishments, a gain of no less than 30 per cent in the
decade and a half. Here is the concrete result of the improved
equipment, the greater skill,the more efficient organization of
American industry which marked the forward movement of the
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earlyyçars of the century. Yet this record was substantially bet-
tered during the decade from 1919 to 1929. Production per wage-
earner in manufacturing industries increased by approximately 43
per cent in this single ten-year stretch. Seventy men in 1929 could
do the work that required 100 men in 1919. During this decade of
remarkable technical accomplishment emphasis was definitely shifted
from mere numbers, as a means of accelerating production, to those
factors of equipment, skill and organization which enhance the pro-
ductive powers of the individual worker. It was an unprecedented
advance. It appears now to have been an advance to which, under
existing conditions of knowledge and with existing instruments of
industrial control, our economic system could not be promptly
adapted.
Difficulties of adaptation are discernible in several directions,
in the records of this decade. An increasing volume of unemploy-
ment during an era of economic expansion was, considering its
magnitude, a new phenomenon in our history. Equally striking are
the related statistics of industrial displacement. The human inci-
dence of industrial change is to be traced in such statistics, which
measure the shifting of labor among manufacturing industries. The
data of the pre-war period provide a standard of comparison in the
interpretation of these figures. Between the terminal years of each
of the three five-year census periods falling betwen 1899 and 1914
an average of 21 men out of every 1,000 employed were separated
given manufacturing industries. (The data relate to move-
ments of labor from industry to industry, not to intra-industry
shifts.) For the same periods accessions (additions to the number
employed) averaged 149 to each 1,000 persons employed. That is,
the number employed was expanding, and the number of men forced
',outof given manufacturing industries was distinctly smaller than
the number of new men taken on by other manufacturing indus-
tries.
Markedly different is the post-war record. On the average, over
each of the three biennial census periods coming between 1923 and
1929, 49 men out of every 1,000 employed were separated from
given manufacturing industries. Additions to the number employed
averaged 45 to every 1,000 on the payrolls of manufacturing plants.
Separations measure the burden placed upon wage-earners by in-
dustrial change. That it was a heavy burden during the prosperous
period from 1923 to 1929 is indicated by these figures. Not only532 ECONOMICTENDENCIES
was the rate of separation much higher than it had been over longer
pre-war periods; it was higher than the accession rate, which may
be taken as an index of employment opportunities in manufacturing
industries. Between 1923 and 1929 men were being turned out of
manufacturing industries in greater numbers than in pre-war years,
while the numbers of new men taken on were relatively much
smaller.High productivity and rapidly expanding production
brought instability of employment and uncertainty of income to
many, during this era of business prosperity.
Instability and uncertainty were not alone the lot of those work-
ers who were displaced during this period. Although, on the surface,
the industrial advance of the 'twenties bore signs of stability, there
were certain underlying tendencies toward a basic instability which
contained a potential threat to others. Some emphasis has been
placed, in preceding pages, on the divergence of growth rates char-
acteristic of different industries and of other elements of the eco-
nomic system. Such divergence, reflecting changes in productive
conditions, changes in technical methods and changes in ultimate
demand, is doubtless a necessary feature of a living economy. In
some degree,it represents adaptation of certain elements of the
economy to changes in other elements. But, inevitable though these
differing rates of secular advance may be,itis certain that they
involve shifting of labor and capital and a whole host of minor
modifications in the structure of the economic system at large. A
flexible and adaptable system is necessary, if an organism as com-
plex as that which meets our material needs is constantly to be
accommodated to variations in the growth of its constituent parts.
Such divergence existed in pre-war years, in fairly pronounced
form. If we take account of the numbers engaged and of the mag-
nitudes of the capital sums involved, it is probable that the degree
of divergence between 1922 and 1929 exceeded that of the period
1901-1913, and that proportionately heavier strains were placed
upon the economic system.
A speeding-up of the rate of industrial displacement, with a
corresponding increase in the volume of unemployment, was but
one aspect of the problem raised by disparities of growth rates
among American industries. Shifts in marketing methods and or-
ganizations, obsolescence of equipment, the emergence of new and
untried industries with their demands for men, for markets, for
capital, for credit and for places in the industrial sun, and the gen-ATTRIBUTES OF THE POST-WAR DECADE 533
eration of risks which new industries and new methods inevitably
bring—these, equally, were manifestations of divergence in rates
of economic change. All these served to intensify the demands for
flexibility and adaptability in our economic system. These demands
were made, moreover, at a time when elements of structural rigidity
and inflexibility were apparently growing in strength.
In yet another respect the tendencies of the post-war period
served to accentuate certain factors of instability in modern eco-
nomic life. It is a commonplace, of course, that industrialization has
brought a pronounced change in the directions in which our cur-
rent productive energies are exerted. Under simple conditions, the
immediate necessities of life—food, clothing, essential shelter—
constitute the chief products of human labor. As the margin be-
tween productive power and immediate needs widens, more labor
may be devoted to the making of instruments of production and of
various goods, durable and non-durable, which satisfy the less im-
Sperative needs of man. It is characteristic of such goods (capital
equipment, and non-essential consumption goods) that the demand
for them is highly elastic, capable of extreme expansion and rapid
contraction under the influence of price changes or of changes in
the attitudes and expectations of buyers. The same thing is true of
certain essential but durable consumers' goods, such as housing. The
necessities of existence, on the other hand, particularly those which
are non-durable or semi-durable in character, are marked by inelastic
demand. Except under extreme conditions the amounts required and
currently purchased do not vary greatly. It is difficult to stimulate
increased demand for such goods, while contraction of demand is
difficult on the side of the user.
These facts have a direct bearing on the stability of processes in
a competitive economy. Barring the play of extraneous forces (such
as crop failures), less variation is to be expected in production, the
larger the proportion of perishable and semi-durable consumption
goods in the annual output of an economy. As capital equipment,
durable goods in general and non-essential consumers' goods come
to occupy a larger place in total output, demand is capable of rapid
expansion (under advertising or other stimulus) and of rapid con-
traction, with corresponding fluctuations in productive activity.'
Asan entry on the credit side of the ledger, we should note that greater
productivity of labor and a higher average standard of living may be expected
to accompany an increase in the amount of capital equipment employed.534 ECONOMIC TENDENCIES
All this is obvious enough. It is important in the present re-
view because tendencies long present in our economic development
were speeding the output of goods of elastic demand between 1922
and 1929. As in the period 1901-1913, but in much greater degree,
production was becoming diversified in the recent period. The
volume of output of those incidental, supplementary, non-standard
goods which escape enumeration when account is taken only of the
basic staples was expanding at a rapid rate. (The rate of increase
in volume of production between 1922 and 1929 is raised from 3.3
per cent a year, for directly measurable physical units, to 3.8 per
cent, when these non-standard goods are included. The correspond-
ing pre-war correction was from 2.9 to 3.1 per cent a year.) This
diversification of output meant that goods of secondary importance,
goods of elastic demand, were occupying a constantly larger place
in the budgets of consumers and in the purchases of business buyers.
Such diversification brought with it the potentiality of a correspond-
ing contraction, for elasticity may work in two directions.
More direct evidence on this point is furnished by the records
of output of durable and non-durable goods. We have seen that the
output of durable goods, goods which are relatively unstable in
their production, was increasing between 1922 and 1929 at a rate
of 5.9 per cent a year, while the production of non-durable com-
modities advanced at a rate of but 2.8 per cent a year. A margin
of the same type prevailed between the turn of the century and the
outbreak of the war, and doubtless prevailed during many other
periods of industrial expansion. But it is the size of the margin in
the post-war decade which is significant. The new productive powers
which were generated by improved technique and better equipment
during this decade were devoted largely to the output of goods
of relatively long life and of correspondingly elastic demand, goods
which are characterized by exceptionally high instability of pro-
duction. In devoting a greater proportion of our productive energies
to such durable goods (the proportion so devoted was, roughly, 26
per cent during the pre-war period studied, 34 per cent during the
post-war period) we accentuate elements of instability in produc-
tive processes.
Finally, we have noted the extremely rapid advance, during the
decade of the 'twenties, in the production of that particular class
of durable goods which is used in further production. In this period
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ment at a rate which exceeded even that of the pre-war expansion
when the economies of large-scale,capitalistic production were
being so earnestly exploited in this country. Our best estimates
indicate a pre-war growth of production of capital equipment at a
rate of 5.0 per cent a .year, a post-war advance at a rate of 6.4 per
cent. (These figures relate to annual additions to and replacements
of capital equipment, not to the total existing supply.) The standard
of living was being maintained, and raised, during the years that
fell between the two great post-war depressions, but in even greater
degree we were augmenting the instruments of roundabout produc-
tion. Machines, engines, tools, plants—into the making of these the
new productive energies were poured.
Viewing these events in retrospect, a question naturally arises
as to whether these new energies were well and wisely expended
during this period. When goods are made for immediate sale and
direct consumption, errors concerning effective demand are of
course possible, but the detection of the error is likely to come fairly
promptly. But when we make goods which will eventuate in a fin-
ished, consumable product only after the lapse of considerable time
and after various intermediate processes have been completed, more
serious errors are possible. If we take account of the customary
elasticity of demand for capital goods, and of the variability of pro-
duction which results from business errors,faulty investment,
financing with an eye to security markets rather than to markets for
goods, we have a highly unstable element indeed in this particular
segment of the economic structure. In view of these potential in-
stabilities, the pouring of resources into this field was a particularly
significant feature of the expansion of 1922-29.
It is not difficult to pdint to post-war tendencies in the field of
production which, surveyed with the advantages of hind-sight, ap-
pear to have contained the seeds of trouble. The truth is that, in
•large degree, we lack standards based on comprehensive knowledge
of economic processes by which we might detect such tendencies
before trouble is precipitated. Even after the event we cannot def-
•initely affirm that, with reference to the state of our industrial
development and the character of our distributive processes, too
large a proportion of our productive resources was being devoted,
prior to 1929, to the production of durable goods in general, and of
capital equipment in particular. But there is strong indication that
this was so.536 ECONOMICTENDENCIES
Trade Movements and the Balance of International Payments.
Among the factors shaping the economic development of the United
States during the present century, those growing out of our inter-
national economic relations have increased in relative importance at
a rapid rate. The initial stimulus of new world possessions and of
wider outlook given by the Spanish War was reënforced by growing
economic power and the search for wider markets during the next
decade and a half. In the years following 1914 a second and greater
stimulus carried us full into the broad stream of international eco-
nomic activity. The strength of the bonds which tie us to the world
economy was increased many-fold. Financially and commercially
the economy of the United States became an integral part of the
world structure.
During the period 1901-1913 there was a substantial balance of
merchandise exports over imports, but imports were growing at a.
more rapid pace than exports. Crude materials, foodstuffs and
semi-manufactured goods were the import groups which were in-
creasing most rapidly. The lag of exports behind imports, in this
pre-war advance, was due entirely to declines in the exports of crude
and manufactured foodstuffs. Exports of semi-manufactured and
finished goods were increasing at notably high rates. Our inter-
national economic function was definitely shifting, as the impor-
tance of our manufacturing industries increased, and as our food-
exporting industries lost place.
After the war-time revolution in our trade and financial rela-
tions with the rest of the world, quite different tendencies prevailed.
Between 1922 and 1929 the physical volume of exports increased
at a rate well above that at which domestic production was advanc-
ing (the rate of growth of exports, by volume, was 6.5 per cent a
year), while the volume of imports grew at a rate approximating
that of domestic production (the rate of growth of imports, by
volume, was 3.9 per cent a year). Commodity exports played a
more active part, absolutely and relatively, in stimulating domestic
production during post-war years than they had done in pre-war
years. To a greater extent than before the war semi-manufactured
and manufactured goods dominated the post-war advance. Exports
of finished manufactures were approximately doubled in aggregate
value between 1922 and 1929. (These dominating export groups,
it may be noted, consisted largely of goods subject to highly elastic
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goods.)A considerable part of the stimulus to this great expansion
came from a forced draught of heavy foreign lending, but the effect
on the volume and on the character of domestic production was none
the less real.
The increase in commodity exports was accompanied by a con-
siderable decline in the average unit price of goods exported, a de-
cline at an average annual rate of 2.2 per cent. The aggregate value
of exports did not advance as rapidly as did export volume. This
post-war decline in the unit price of exports is associated with a
notable aftermath of the war, as regards the international economic
relations of the United States. A comparison of export unit prices
with import unit prices indicates that, on the average, the goods we
exported increased in price between 1913 and 1921 by 28 per cent
more than did the goods we imported. That is, the terms of ex-
change in world markets between the goods we sold and the goods
we bought had altered to our material advantage during the interval
between 1913 and 1921. This differential advantage persisted,
though in lessened degree, during the several years following. Not
until 1926 was it reversed. In 1929 the margin again moved to our
advantage. (The standard of reference throughout is based on
1913 relations.)
There are some uncertainties attaching to the comparison of
export and import prices, but the general situation is clear. After
the immediate post-war disturbances had ended, manufacturing
nations in general enjoyed an advantage in their price relations
with raw-material producing areas. It was a deceptive and tempo-
rary advantage in some respects, since it served to reduce the buying
power of these raw-material producing areas, but as long as the
flow of goods cotild be maintained the advantage persisted. We
kept up the outward flow of goods, and indeed increased it, by
means of heavy foreign loans. These loans facilitated foreign sales
at favorable prices, to the distinct profit of exporting manufac-
turers. The steady decline in export prices, relatively to import
prices, served to reduce the price advantage toward the end of the
post-war period under survey, while at the same time our campaign
of foreign lending ran into difficulties of its own. While the advan-
tage persisted, and while sales kept up, the situation was a happy
one for the average American exporter. But it did not possess the
characteristics of permanence.
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are certain points of contrast between pre-war and post-war periods.
The following tabular summary reveals these differences.
TABLE 213
BALANCES OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1896-1914, 1922-1929
Average Annual Balances of Credits and Debits for Four Major
Classes of Transactions '.
.
Classof transaction
Average annual balance, in millions
of dollars
1896-1914 1922-1929
Credit Debit Credit Debit
Goods and services, net
Payment on debts, net
Net capital movement
Net movement of currency and gold











L Seefootnote to Table 187,p.472, for an explanation of the signs defining the credit
and debit character of the items in this table.
There are two major differences between these periods. Pay-
nient on debts, a debit item of 310 millions annually in the earlier
period, was a credit item of 339 millions in the post-war period.
The net capital movement, which was inward at the rate of 53 mil-
lions a year between 1896 and 1914, was an outward flow averag-
ing 451 millions a year in the later period. This last item was almost
enough in itself to cover the debt payments due us, and to pay for
the export balance of goods and services. If it was a forced draught
that kept up our expanding volume of exports during this period,
this was the form that the draught took.
The Growth of Capital and Credit.No generation more than
ours has devoted itself to the accumulation of capital funds. The
mechanism of investment experienced a mushroom growth in the
years following the war, and an elaborate structure, permeating
every corner of the country, was developed. The rapid growth of
insurance, the increased saving to be expected as a result of greater
earnings and expanding profits, the steady impetus to the ploughing
back of earnings which derives from the corporate mechanism wereATTRIBUTES OF THE POST-WAR DECADE 539
supplemented by an influx of funds from individuals who were
seeking not so much future incomes as prompt enhancement of
capital values. A speculative fervor accentuated the pressure toward
increased savings which is a continuing feature of the economic or-
ganization and of the social attitudes which now prevail.
Evidence, on the physical side, of the force of this development
between 1922 and 1929 has already been discussed. Year by year,
a steadily increasing proportion of our current productive power
was being devoted to the construction of capital equipment of all
sorts. The annual output of such goods increased at the rapid rate
of 6.4 per cent a year, a rate materially greater than that for con-
sumption goods. The survey of changes in capital funds substan-
tiates this evidence.
Annual additions to capital funds in the form of proceeds from
new capital flotations advanced rapidly. Each year from four to
seven and one-half billions of dollars of new funds were received
from this source alone. The reduction of the gross debt of the Fed-
eral government contributed to this development by adding some
billions of dollars to the new funds available for investment be-
tween 1922 and 1929.' Obligations arising out of the consumptive
expenditures of the war years were thus made the vehicle for real,
though forced, saving in subsequent years. Forces working toward
saving and capital accumulation during these years were reënforced
by this debt retirement policy of the central government. From an-
other source, annual corporate savings through additions to surplus,
from one to three billions of dollars were annually added to the
capital funds available to the business community. Here is the
financial side of the rapid increase in the construction of capital
equipment already noted.
These additions, and others not specifically mentioned, led to
a steady increase in the total supply of invested funds. Aggregate
capital funds constitute, of course, a very large sum, much more
stable in its changes than are the annual increments. Corporate cap-
ital funds alone, we have estimated, increased from approximately
184 billions of dollars in 1922 to 228 billions of dollars in 1929, an
increase averaging 3.1 per cent a year. If we recall that the popula-
1Theindebtedness of the Federal government was reduced by about six billions
of dollars between 1922 and 1929, but some of the funds thus made available for
investment would undoubtedly have been saved had taxes, rather than debt, been
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tion of the country was increasing during this period at a rate of
but 1.4 per cent a year, the significance of this advance may be more
readily appreciated. As regards both rapidity of growth and mag-
nitude of the sums involved, this expansion of capital funds prob-
ably exceeded that recorded during any similar period of our
history.
The growth of capital funds had important consequences for
the economic system as a whole. It meant a tremendous power of
absorption in the securities markets, a buying power which helped
to maintain an upward swing in security prices for an exceptionally
long period. It facilitated the improvement of the mechanical equip-
ment of American industry, an improvement which went forward
at a very rapid rate and which was a major factor in the great in-
crease in the productivity of manufacturing labor during post-war
years. In thus facilitating mechanical improvement, the accumula-
tion of new capital was a factor in the problem of technological
unemployment. Taken in conjunction with the pronounced rise in
popularity of common stocks, as against bonds, the existence of an
ample supply of capital funds not only served to provide corpora-
tions with the means of improving their mechanical equipment but
placed them in relatively stronger financial position by permitting
substitution of lower yield obligations for higher, and by facilitat-
ing the raising of capital by stock rather than by bond issues. And,
not least important, the availability and cheapness of investment
funds permitted, if it did not stimulate, a change in the relations
between business and banking. There was a tendency, on the part
of business, to finance current operations out of investment funds.1
Commercial credit supplied directly by banks to business played a
less important role in business operations. One result of this was
a decline in the effectiveness of the control which banking interests
could exercise over business.
Some of these relationships are, of course, circular. Thus, ample
capital enhances the productivity of industry; the productivity of
industry conduces to saving, and hence to the accumulation of new
supplies of capital. But, considering this as an independent element,
the existence of ample supplies of capital explains some of the
distinctive characteristics of the post-war economic era in the
United States.
1Thereverse of this, a tendency to utilize short-term funds for investment
purposes, affected certain elements of the credit structure.ATTRIBUTES OF THE POST-WAR DECADE 541
Thatmixture of short- and long-term funds which is repre-
sented by the loans and investments of banks increased between
1922 and 1929 at a cumulative rate of 5.6 per cent a year, appre-
ciably higher than the rate of increase of capital funds. This ex-
pansion, apparently a definitely inflationary movement, exceeded the
rate of growth of production and the rate of increase of trade. The
grand volume of bank credit was made up, however, of two ele-
ments, changing at quite different rates between 1922 and 1929.
Credit which had an obvious and direct relation to the market for
securities (investments, and loans on securities) increased by 7.9
per cent a year during this period, while 'all other loans', represent-
ing, in the main, credit used for commercial purposes, increased in
volume by 3.2 per cent a year. Less exact but acceptable data from
another source indicate that the aggregate amount of urban realty
mortgages increased at an average rate of 12.5 per cent a year
between 1922 and 1929.
The story of credit expansion during this period is, then, a rec-
ord of expansion along sharply delimited lines. Credit was utilized
by those to whom it was available in such a way as to enhance values
in two major markets—markets for securities and for urban realty.
If the excess buying power resulting from the relatively rapid
growth of total bank credit affected commodity markets in general,
the effect was to maintain rather than to advance prices. There
is some indication, as we have seen, that the selling prices of manu-
factured goods did not decline during this period to a degree com-
mensurate with the fall of production costs. Any inflationary effects
felti1commoditymarkets were of this negative type.
Movements of Prices and Costs.The period 1922-1929 fol-
lowed a fundamental shake-up in economic relations, a shake-up
that profoundly modified the terms on which economic agents of
all types disposed of their products and their services in the market-
place. These modifications, as well as the tendencies prevailing dur-
ing the years immediately under review, concern us in this survey.
Far-reaching in its effects was the reversal which the recession
of 1920-21 brought in the relations between the prices of raw ma-
terials, particularly industrial raw materials, and of the products
of manufacture. The story of the years before the war in this
country was a story of constantly cheapening manufactured goods.
Refinement of technical methods, development of mass production,542 ECONOMIC TENDENCIES
improvement of management were all tending to lower the prices
paid by consumers for the services of fabricating agents. Raw ma-
terials as a class, on the other hand, were rising in value, relatively
to manufactured goods. The margin of production was being pushed
further out, and no widespread improvements of technique at all
comparable to those so familiar in manufacturing had been devel-
oped. After 1913 a change in conditions occurred. Productive tech-
nique improved in the cultivation and extraction of raw products.
Rich new territories were exploited, temporary war demands and a
rapidly rising price level stimulated rapid expansion in the output
of certain of these goods. The termination of the war checked these
temporary demands. Perhaps more important, the world-wide de-
flation of prices found raw material producers unprepared for or
unable to adapt themselves to a new order through prompt liqui-
dation, readjustment of costs and adjustment of production to
changed demand conditions.
The ending of the war demand and the deflation of prices struck
manufacturing interests a sharp blow, just as it did raw material
producers. Manufacturing producers, however, were able to liqui-
date more promptly and to adapt production schedules to marketing
possibilities more readily. In some degree, also, manufacturing pro-
ducers adjusted costs to the new price level. But, as we have seen
in Chapter VIII, no thoroughgoing readjustment of costs was made.
Labor costs remained at a level materially above that prevailing in
1913-14, and the costs of the services of management and owner-
ship were high, and advancing. The effects of this realignment of
economic agents and this reapportionment of purchasing power per-
sisted, to color the economic record of the following decade. The
advance in raw material prices between 1921 and 1929 and the
relative decline in the prices of manufactured goods diminished the
margin between them, but to the end a price advantage persisted for
manufacturers. The events of 1929-32 gave another wrench to the
price structure more violent, in many respects, than that of 1920-
21. But these developments lie beyond our immediate interest.
This cleavage between the prices of industrial raw materials and
of manufactured goods has affected economic processes throughout
the world. With a limited number of exceptions, raw material pro-
ducers in all parts of the world were in a position of marked eco-
nomic weakness during the decade of the 'twenties. This weakness
led to numerous ill-starred valorization efforts, impaired the pur-ATTRIBUTES OF THE POST-WAR DECADE 543
chasing power of colonial areas, clogged the flow of world trade
and placed heavy strains upon the mechanism of international
finance. The post-war economic difficulties of industrial areas were
intensified by theseconditions, though nominal pricerelations
worked to their advantage.'
The story of the American farmer is a phase of the tale just
pre-war improvement of status, war-time affluence,
abrupt decline in 1920-21, followed by a decade of relatively sub-
normal purchasing power during which slow recovery failed to
restore complete pre-war parity with other classes of producers. Low
prices for his products brought depreciation of his capital assets,
while the rising value of the monetary unit intensified the burden
of his mortgage debt. The record of recovery between 1921 and
1929 must not be under-emphasized, however, for substantial gains
were made. A continuation of the tendencies then prevailing would
have raised the agricultural producer to his pre-war position in the
economic world. But it is now history that these tendencies were
rudely checked. The story of 1929-32 is, for the farmer, a repeti-
tion of that of 1920-21, except that the recent decline started from
no such peak of well-being as had been attained before the earlier
fall occurred.
The relations between the purchasing power trends of producers'
goods and consumers' goods were identical in the pre-war and post-
war periods. Producers' goods were declining slightly in purchasing
power, consumers' goods were appreciating slightly. But the devel-
opments during the interregnum from 1914 to 1921 are here of
particular importance. These developments intensified the effects of
preceding trends, substantially cheapening producers' goods, ma-
terially enhancing the real values of consumers' goods. So the situ-
ation stood in 1922. The succeeding decline in the real per-unit
values of producers' goods and the accompanying rise in the real
values of consumers' goods tended to widen the margin existing in
1922. The widening was slight; what is significant is the absence of
any tendency toward a correction of the breach made in 1920-21.
These measurements indicate that the prices paid by the com-
munity for the services of fabricating agents were high after the
events of 1920-21, and remained at a high level during the ensuing
1SeeGustav Cassel, "Disturbances in the World Economy Owing to Relative
Changes in Prices", Skandinciviska Kreditaktiebolaget, July, 1931, for an effective
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years. There is definite evidence to substantiate this. If we take
1914 as a standard of reference, and if we measure changes in dol-
lars of constant purchasing power, at wholesale, we find that labor
costs, per unit of manufactured product, were, in 1921, 38 per cent
above the level of the base year (1914), and, in 1923, 27 per cent
above that base. These costs declined thereafter, with advancing
productivity, but in 1929 remained 15 per cent above the base year
level. Similarly measured, overhead charges plus profits, per unit
of manufactured product, were, in 1921, 10 per cent greater than
in 1914 and, in 1923, 20 per cent greater. By 1929 these charges
were 32 per cent above the 1914 level. (The fact that 1914
a year of depression would serve to increase the value of this index
in a subsequent year of prosperity.) The pronounced pre-war
tendency toward declining fabrication costs was sharply reversed
by the upheaval of 1920-21, and had not definitely reasserted itself,
as regards total fabrication costs (including profits), between 1923
and 1929. Over a considerable area of manufacturing activity,
indeed, profits per unit of product actually advanced during the
period of expansion preceding the 1929 break. These relatively high
costs of the services of agents of fabrication mean, of course, that
industrial wage-earners, entrepreneurs and others drawing incomes
from manufacturing industries were in positions of relative advan-
tage during these years. Urban and financial prosperity was a
dominant feature of the period.
The relations among elements of the post-war price structure
were in many respects unlike those of pre-war days. In the United
States, at least, the post-war economy functioned during the dec-
ade of the 'twenties on the basis of a new division of economic ele-
ments. On the one side there existed low prices for the materials of
fabrication, and relatively low incomes and purchasing power among
farmers and raw material producers generally; 1 on the other, a
high cost of living, high prices for manufactured goods (notably
those intended for consumption), high industrial wages, high
profits and industrial prosperity. The high cost of fabrication, the
high prices of manufactured goods and the relatively high cost of
living were, in some degree, necessary consequences of the general
1Formost raw materials, such conditions affected producers the world over.
We should note, co-existing with these conditions, the continual necessity of bor-
rowing on the part of important raw-material producing areas, a necessity due,
in general, to the stage of economic development attained, and not arising directly
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acceptance of the principle of high wages and the recognition of the
necessity of protecting workers against industrial hazards. This
brought desirable social progress in certain directions. The conse-
quences for other economic elements—for the agricultural pro-
ducer, for the producer of materials in the non-industrialized cor-
ners of the world, for lower-grade salaried workers—have not yet
been fully explored. It is certain that no permanent adjustment to
the new relations among economic elements was secured during the
post-war expansion.
In contrast to the apparently favorable price situation on the
operating side, for manufacturing industries generally, we have
noted the persistence during the period from 1922 to 1929 of
relatively high costs of capital equipment. In relation to a pre-war
standard, prices of goods intended for use in such equipment re-
mained above the general level. Moreover, construction charges
were high. We come to the end of the period in 1929 with a very
large volume of new capital equipment of allsorts, much of it
constructed under conditions of exceptionally high cost. The full
weight of this burden was not felt while activity remained at high
levels, but in the years which followed these capitalized costs became
a major factor in the problem of readjustment.
Most of the price shifts we have discussed occurred quite sharply
during the recession of 1920-2 1. It is a nice question as to how and
why working economic relations were restored and the flow of goods
to consumers was resumed so promptly after this recession, with
•the purchasing power of raw material producers so low and with the
prices of consumers' goods at such relatively high levels. The solu-
tion of the problem at that time was undoubtedly facilitated by an
extraordinary and unprecedented increase in industrial productivity
—an advance of 13.6 per cent in output per wage-earner between
1921 and 1923, on top of an increase of 2.9 per cent between 1919
and 1921. The aggregate purchasing power of agricultural pro-
•ducers and of producers of certain other raw materials remained
low, but this remarkable gain in industrial productivity, combined
with the position of marked price advantage enjoyed by manufac-
turing producers after 1921, permitted a great advance in the aggre-
gate purchasing power of industrial wage-earners and of other
drawing their incomes from manufacturing industries. The
:ncreased purchasing power of these groups, the stimulus of rapid
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new foreign markets more than compensated, at the time, for the
low purchasing power of agricultural producers. These conditions
permitted the free flow of goods to consumers, even though such
goods were relatively high-priced.
The eight years following witnessed some amelioration of the
inequalities so conspicuous in 1921. The impact of a new recession
in 1929 re-opened many of the old cleavages and raised again many
of the problems which the first post-war recession had presented.
The nature of the settlement now to be made remains to be deter-
mined.
Apart from group changes and structural price shifts, certain
more general aspects of the price movements of recent years have
been dealt with in the preceding pages. Some significance has been
attached to evidences of increasingstability of the individual
elements of the price system. There was a persistent decline in the
degree of variation of prices, a decline with reference not only to
the standards of the disturbed war years, but also as compared with
conditions prevailing before the war. There are some reasons for
thinking that this decline reflects the growth of control, and indi-
cates a reduction in the sensitivity of prices to changes in market
conditions. In the system of prices at large, of course, the flexibility
that perfect competitive conditions might give has never existed.
It is probable that the degree of flexibility has been declining. The
extending sphere of influence of public utilities, with regulated
rates; the crystallization of wage rates under collective bargaining;
the growing importance of trade associations and of other types
of collective agreement among producers (mergers, cartels, export
associations); the packaging and trade-marking of goods—all these
tend in some degree to change the character of price movements,
and to lessen their fluctuations. Whether this tendency toward sta-
bility marks the loss of a desirable sensitivity, whether that nice
coordination of economic processes which unrestrained competition
and price freedom are designed to provide is prevented through price
rigidity, we cannot now say. But the available evidence indicates
that some such loss of elasticity in the price system may have oc-
curred during the years preceding the current depression.
There is one aspect of this matter which bears upon the course
and character of price changes during the recession which began in
1929, in comparison with that of 1920-2 1. In May, 1920, commodity
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had carried the general level up 23 per cent, and after a five-year
advance amounting to 142 per cent. The level from which the de-
cline started was not one which bore any of the aspects of perma-
nence. As was noted in an earlier section, the relations among
different elements of the price structure which existed in May, 1920,
had prevailed for only a short time. They did not represent a con-
solidated position. Few long-term commitments had been made
upon the basis of the 1920 price level. As a result, barriers to liqui-
dation were relatively weak. Within eleven months the index of
average prices dropped 44 per cent, at an average rate of 5.1 per
cent a month. A violent price recession was concentrated within
a period of less than a year.
Sharply different was the creeping, persistent illness which began
in July of 1929. During eight years of but slight change in the gen-
eral price level that consolidation of position which was absent in
1920 had been effected. New price relations had been established
during these years, new wage policies had been accepted, enduring
commitments had been made, and a sense of the permanence of
the existing level of commodity values had been built up. A great
volume of debts—mortgages, insurance claims, obligations of all
sorts—had been contracted. All these conditions constituted barriers
to a downward readjustment of commodity values. These barriers
were particularly strong in industries with high overhead costs or
with heavy labor charges. The relative slowness of the ensuing de-
cline—1.2 per cent a month to June, 1932, as against 5.1 per cent
during the stage of sharp liquidation in 1920-21—reflects in con-
siderable part the continuing presence of obstacles to liquidation
which did not exist in comparable degree at the time of the earlier
break.
The slow secular inflation which helped to provide the setting
for business during the two decades preceding the war was stimu-
lated during the war years, and reached its peak in 1920. During
the following decade the net movement was a declining one. We
may not now assert that a long period of declining prices lies before
us, for a reversal of trend may occur. But until evidence of such a
reversal appears we must proceed on the assumption that a ten-
dency toward secular price deflation has played a part in economic
processes since 1920.
Long-term price trends are manifest to us in their effects on the
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presses itself in prolonged periods of cyclical price rise, curtailed
periods of cyclical decline, while a falling price level is manifest in
shortened periods of cyclical rise, extended periods of cyclical de-
cline. Such a secular trend has an important bearing on the recurring
problems of readjustment which accompany the uneven cyclical
movements of prices, particularly on the problem of readjusting the
prices of manufactured goods to a changed general level. In general,
whatever the direction of the trend, liquidation during cyclical price
recessions is most painful and most tardy among manufactured
goods, especially among manufactured consumers' goods. Relatively
fIxed costs and established prices prevail in the production and sale
of these goods. When the trend is a rising one, the persistent, under-
lying force of the long-term advance in the price level operates to
stimulate recovery, after depression, among raw materials, pro-
ducers' goods and those other groups which are most sensitive to
changes in monetary conditions. Some liquidation among fabricated
goods there must be at such times, but the upward push of prices,
affecting most immediately the commodity groups which suffer most
severely in the cyclical drop, shortens and softens the downward re-
vision of values and costs among the tardy elements of the price
system. Under these conditions an early restoration of working
relations among the laggard groups and the more sensitive corn-
modities is facilitated.
A declining price trend, on the other hand, intensifies all the
difficultiesof readjustment.Prices of commodities among the
groups which are most sensitive to the forces of cyclical recession
are further depressed through the persistent push of the long-term
factor. Pressure toward liquidation among manufactured goods
persists, in aggravated form.
Here, perhaps, is a partial explanation of some of the discrep-
ancies among price groups which persisted throughout the decade of
the 'twenties, as well as of the difficulties which ensued. The buoy-
ant stimulus of cheapening money has not been present to speed
readjustment and to shorten the period and curtail the degree of
liquidation enforced upon manufactured goods. The secular force
of changing monetary values has tended to push down the prices of
raw materials and of producers' goods, leaving upon manufacturers
a weightier burden of readjustment than was theirs in happier times
of rising prices. With the heavy investment in capital equipment
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headcosts in the typical modern industry, the stresses of readjust-
ment necessitated by a protracted period of falling prices might be
expected to be more painful and prolonged than in any preceding
period of falling prices. Some of these strains we are at present
experiencing.
Changes in the Aggregate Purchasing Power of Producing
Groups.In defining the tendencies of a period, as regards the flow
of physical goods, it is not enough to measure changes in the volume
of goods produced by various economic groups—by farmers, by
producers of raw mineral products, by agents of fabrication. The
flow of physical goods to each of these producing groups, in return
for its physical contribution, constitutes the other and equally essen-
tial half of the story. Unfortunately, we do not have records which
permit us to measure directly the number of physical units of goods
of all sorts received by farmers, by industrial workers and by other
producing groups in exchange for their products. It has been neces-
sary to approach the problem indirectly. From statistics of physical
output of goods of a given type, and from records of the change,
between stated dates, in the per-unit purchasing power of this out-
put, it is possible to approximate the change in the purchasing power
of aggregate output. Variations in this aggregate purchasing power
may be taken to measure changes in the volume of physical goods
received by a given producing group.
Two points require emphasis. We have sought to measure
changes in aggregate purchasing power between stated dates, or
over a given period. No comparison, in absolute terms, of the aggre-
gate purchasing power of different groups has been attempted. Sec-
ondly, a change in the aggregate purchasing power of a given group
would accurately define the change in the physical income of that
group only if the money income of the group were spent for goods
in terms of which per-unit purchasing power is measured. It is not
possible to measure changes in per-unit purchasing power with
precision for all the groups here studied. The derived measurements
define general tendencies, however, and it is with these that we are
now concerned.
Between 1922 and 1929 the physical volume of production in
the United States (excluding construction) increased at a rate of
3.8 per cent a year. The total flow of goods produced was appor-
tioned among many groups. We deal here with only three.550 ECONOMICTENDENCIES
The stream of goods going to producers of raw farm products
and of raw mineral products increased in volume by approximately
two per cent a year over this period, while that going to agents
of fabrication increased by some five per cent a year. The gain was
general, but the advance was far more rapid for manufacturing
groups than for the other two. These movements differ somewhat
from those of the pre-war era. Out of a stream of goods increasing
at a rate of 3.1 per cent a year between 1901 and 1913, the portion
going to producers of raw farm products, as a group, increased by
slightly more than two per cent a year, that going to producers of
raw mineral products increased by about four per cent a year, while
that going to agents of fabrication increased by approximately three
per cent a year. Manufacturing groups enjoyed no such relative
advantage as in the later period.
The rate of change in the aggregate purchasing power of a
given group of producers may differ from the rate of change in the
physical volume of production of the economic system as a whole
because the output of that group is changing at a rate different from
that prevailing in the economy as a whole, or because the prices of
its products are rising or falling with reference to the prices of the
goods bought by the group. The gain in aggregate purchasing power
of farmers between 1922 and 1929 reflected favorable price move-
ments as well as increased physical contribution. The same favorable
conditions swelled the purchasing power of agents of fabrication.
Producers of raw mineral products increased their physical con-
tribution materially, but the declining per-unit purchasing power of
their products reduced the rate of gain in command over goods.
We are able to break the group 'agents of fabrication' into two
sub-divisions—wage-earners, and a residual group including sal-
aried employees, owners and creditors. There was a marked differ-
ence between the rates of gain of these two groups during this
period. The aggregate command over goods exercised by manufac-
turing labor increased at a rate of 3. 1 per cent a year between 1922
and 1929; that of 'ownership and management' increased by 7.3
per cent a year. (For both groups, purchasing power is measured in
terms of wholesale prices.) The difference here is attributable, pri-
marily, to differing rates of change in the real rewards of the two
groups for their respective contributions to each unit of manufac-
tured goods produced. The reward of labor for its contribution to
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constantpurchasing power) was declining, while the rewards of
'ownership and management' (i.e., overhead costs plus profits, in
dollars of constant purchasing power) were increasing between
1922 and 1929. These differences between post-war tendencies stand
in contrast to the pre-war Aggregate real rewards increased
at about the same rate for these two groups between 1901 and 1913.
These changes should be followed over a longer period, if we
are to have a just conception of the relations prevailing in 1929.
We may take 1914 as a starting point, and measure, not annual
rates of change, but net changes over the fifteen years from 1914 to
1929. In 1929 the aggregate physical volume of production (ex-
cluding construction) was approximately 61 per cent greater than
in 1914. The volume of goods that could be bought by producers
of raw farm products, under the existing price and production con-
ditions, was from 10 to 20 per cent greater in 1929 than in 1914.1
Though agricultural output was greater. in 1929 than in 1914 by
about 25 per cent, a loss in per-unit purchasing power prevented an
equal increase in the aggregate volume of goods commanded in ex-
change. For producers of raw mineral products, aggregate command
over goods, at wholesale, was approximately doubled between 1914
and 1929, while the physical income of agents of fabrication, simi-
larly measured, increased by about 130 per cent over the same period.
Substantial increases in the output of the two latter groups combined
with favorable price movements to yield these gains in aggregate
purchasing power. There is a wide margin between the 10 to 20 per
cent increase in the aggregate physical income of farmers, over this
fifteen-year period, and the gains of 100 per cent and more recorded
for the other two groups.
Among agents of fabrication the gain was greater for the com-
posite group of salaried workers, owners and creditors than it was
for wage-earners. The total physical income of manufacturing labor
increased between 1914 and 1929 by from 75 to 100 per cent, while
'ownership and management' gained by from 110 to 150 per cent.2
'The figure is10,if purchasing power be measured in terms of the goods
farmers buy, 21 if measured in terms of wholesale prices.
2Thefirst figure cited, in each case, measures the gain when purchasing power
is measured with reference to the cost of living index. The second figure measures
the gain when purchasing power is measured in terms of wholesale prices. The
latteris not an appropriate standard, but its use is desirable in certain cases
when mutually consistent and comparable results for different groups are required.
A more detailed explanation of these figures and a statement concerning their
limitations are given in Chapter IX.552 ECONOMIC TENDENCIES
No feature of the economic changes of the period which spans
the war and the following decade is more striking than these gains
of agents of fabrication, notably of the group we have designated
'ownership and management'. Elsewhere we have discussed the price
and cost movements which worked to their advantage. Changes in
aggregate physical income of the type just defined measure the
ultimate gains to which swelling output and favorable price changes
both contributed. Together, they served substantially to augment
the aggregate real rewards of manufacturing workers and of the
owners of manufacturing enterprises.'
Aggregate Contributions in Relation to Aggregate Rewards of
Economic Classes.In appraising economic changes over a period
we should set against against the aggregate purchasing power, that
is, the rewards, of different groups data relating to aggregate out-
put, that is, to the contributions, of the same groups. If, between two
dates, the output of a given group increases by more than the vol-
ume of physical goods commanded in exchange (the physical in-
come) there is, presumably, a social gain. This change might be
due to falling production costs, or to price movements unfavorable
to the group in question. The statistical record, by itself, furnishes
no evidence as to the reasons for the change, nor as to whether the
consequences are painful, or the reverse, for the group concerned.
But the comparison of changes in physical output with changes in
physical income provides a ratio of considerable social significance.
Light is thrown on one striking pre-war tendency by a com-
parison of these changes, as they affected manufacturing industries.
For all agents of fabrication there was an increase of approxi-
mately 95 per cent in total production between 1899 and 1914.2
During the same fifteen-year period the total purchasing power of
1Thesestatements are to be interpreted with reference to the several qualifi-
cationspreviously noted. The category 'ownership and management'includes
various heterogeneous items which may have been subject to quite unequal changes
between 1914 and 1929. Again, the first of these years was marked by business de-
pression, while 1929 was a year of prosperity. These conditions would directly
effect volume of output and profits, both of which are important elements in this
comparison. Differences due to cyclical variations, however, would not account for
the pronounced changes cited. A comparison of 1927 with 1914, both years of busi-
ness depression, reveals differences of the same general order, for manufacturing
labor. For and management' the gain in total physical income between
1914 and 1927 lay somewhere between 75 and 110 per cent.
2Thisisthe revised figure, corrected to take account of the diversification
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these producers, measured with reference to changes in the cost of
living, increased by about 50 per cent. The 1914 index of 'contri-
butions' (on the 1899 base) exceeded the index of 'rewards' by
approximately 29 per cent. For manufacturing labor the correspond-
ing figure was 23 per cent, while for 'ownership and management'
in manufacturing industries aggregate 'contributions' in 1914 ex-
ceeded aggregate 'rewards' (measured by index numbers on the
1899 base) by 33 per cent. The increases in the physical output of
these agents of fabrication, between 1899 and 1914, were materially
greater than the increases in the physical goods received in return.
There was a social gain (reflected in the lower real per-unit values
of manufactured goods) from the services of these producers over
this period.
The post-war record shows somewhat different movements.
During the expansion from 1923 to 1929 there was an increase of
approximately three per cent in the ratio of contributions to rewards,
for all agents of fabrication. This conceals divergent tendencies
among the two groups of fabricators. For wage-earners in manu-
facturing industries contributions in excess of withdrawals were
piled up during this six-year period. The ratio increased by 16 per
cent. But for the mixed group we have called 'ownership and man-
agement' the ratio declined by five per cent. The increase in aggre-
gate physical output lagged behind the increase in aggregate physical
reward. If we may interpret the ratio of output to rewards as an
index of social gain or loss, we may say that there was an incre-
mental social gain from the services of manufacturing wage-earners
during this period, an incremental social loss from the services of
owners and managers.'
But here again a longer view is needed if a true picture of the
post-war situation is to be secured. Over the fifteen-year period from
1914 to 1929 the ratio of the aggregate contributions of all agents
of fabrication to their aggregate rewards declined by five per cent.
The increase in the physical income of this group exceeded the in-
1Thesegains and losses were 'incremental', since the data relate only to net
additions to contributions and rewards, or net subtractions from them, during the
period covered. In interpreting such figures account must be taken of conditions
during the base year, which furnishes the standard of reference for all the mea-
surements cited. It should be remembered, too, that figures covering the period 1923
to 1929 relate only to a period of expansion. For all groups, data for 1932 would
differ materially from those for 1929.
No ethical judgment is implied in the use of the terms 'gain' and 'loss'.554 ECONOMIC TENDENCIES
crease in their physical output. This is in notable contrast to the
record of 1899-1914, when an excess contribution of some 29 per
cent was piled up by manufacturing producers. Breaking the group
into its two components, we find that the ratio of contributions to
rewards increased by about three per cent between 1914 and 1929
for manufacturing wage-earners, but declined by approximately
11 per cent for 'ownership and management'. These figures are to
be compared, respectively, with advances of 23 and 33 per cent be-
tween 1899 and 1914.'
Data relating to various other groups of producers have been
presented in earlier sections. For raw material producers an ex-
cess of rewards over contributions prior to 1913 was succeeded by
a growth of contributions exceeding that of rewards, between 1913
and 1929. Sellers of producers' goods increased their contributions
by more than the increase of their rewards during both periods. For
sellers of consumers' goods, rewards increased more rapidly than
contributions during the two periods. Producers of textile products
increased their contributions, relatively to their rewards, during the
first period, but between 1913 and 1929 the increase of contributions
was 13 per cent less than the increase in their rewards.
The story, in detail, need not be repeated here. It is a record, in
a word, of fairly substantial changes in the relations between the
rewards and contributions of different producing groups, changes
which were most pronounced for producers of manufactured goods.
Here the persistent pre-war tendency toward an increasing social
contribution on the part of this group was followed, after 1914, by
a reversal, which increased the aggregate rewards of this group by
an amount substantially in excess of the increase in their total
physical contribution. For manufacturing labor the excess of re-
wards was steadily reduced (as a result of declining labor costs)
after 1921, and was wiped out by 1929, but for ownership and
management an excess of rewards over apparent physical contribu-
tion (as measured by index numbers on the 1914 base) persisted
through 1929.
These, of course, were but a few of the many threads that inter-
laced to form the complex pattern of economic change during the
years that concern us. Yet it has seemed well, in this summary, to
refer to the reverse flow of physical goods, the flow of physical
1Indefining rewards in this and in the preceding paragraphs of this section,
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income which balances the flow of physical outgo, and to attempt
to trace one or two of the major currents in this stream. In any
realistic conception of economic equilibrium the relations between
these flows must occupy a central place. Price and cost changes are
significant because they define alterations in the balance between
these flows. The extreme price changes of the war and immediate
post-war eras were charged with tremendous human significance
because of their bearing, active or passive, on these basic physical
movements. These price changes, and accompanying changes in the
balancing flows of physical goods, worked powerfully to shape the
course of economic events during the era of post-war expansion.
Changes in Distributive Shares.We pass, finally, to the net
effects of all these movements on certain distributive shares, to the
changes in the ultimate returns to different income recipients. In
so far as available data permit, we have followed the fortunes, be-
tween the turn of the century and the outbreak of the war, and
during the period of post-war prosperity, of three or four major
income groups. The earlier period, we have seen, was marked by
modest gains in the real earnings, per capita, of all employed work-
ers (a gain of 0.4 per cent a year), by a slight decline in the real
earnings of manufacturing wage-earners (—0.1 per cent a year),
a considerable decline in the real income of an average bondholder
(—1.2 per cent a year), and a substantial though irregular ad-
vance (averaging 1.2 per cent a year) in the real income of the
average stockholder. These income changes were accompanied by a
decline at a rate of 0.8 per cent per year in the capital value of the
bondholder's investment, and by an advance at a rate of 2.2 per
cent per year in the capital value of the stockholder's investment
(capital values being measured in terms of current dollars, in both
cases).
Of a different order were the tendencies prevailing between
1922 and 1929. Starting from a relatively high level at the be-
ginning of 1922, the general index of real wages advanced by 2.1
per cent a year during the eight years following. Among employees
of manufacturing establishments, real wages per capita advanced by
1.4 per cent a year. Bondholders suffered a slight decline in real
income (—0.1 per cent a year), while common stockholders gained
in real income at a rate of per cent a year. During this period556 ECONOMICTENDENCIES
the capital values of invested funds (in current dollars) increased
at a rate of 1.9 per cent a year for bondholders, at a rate of 18.8
per cent a year for holders of common stocks.
The story that ends in 1929 is an unfinished one, of course, but
the present survey is concerned only with the course of events up to
that date. Not all income recipients have been brought into the brief
summary of the preceding paragraphs, but those there cited played
leading parts in the developments of the decade of the 'twenties.
Employed labor improved a position already strong. (As an offset-
ting factor there was a considerable displacement of labor and a
growing volume of unemployment during this period.) Bondholders
maintained their positions, with a slight loss of current income and
some gain in the capital values of invested funds. Stockholders
gained at unprecedented rates, as regards both current income and
capital values.
The expansion which dominated the course of economic events
during the third decade of the twentieth century started against a
background of violent and unbalanced change. The eight years pre-
ceding had witnessed the abnormal war-time development (abnormal
because the productive and distributive changes and the allocation
of investment funds during this period were not such as would be
found in a normally functioning economy) and the abrupt reversal
of tendencies and relations that took place in 1920 and 1921. On
the physical side there existed, at the beginning of the post-war
expansion, a definite building shortage and, probably,deficiency
of those types of capital equipment not required by the conditions
of war-time demand. Partly because of the effect of the war and
of domestic policy on the course of immigration, partly as a result
of slowly-acting forces more fundamental in their origin, the factors
affecting population growth had been changed. This change was to
exert a far-reaching influence in the years succeeding. On the indus-
trial side, the full effects of technical innovations and of a changing
attitude toward the problems of production were beginning to be
felt. A surge forward in productivity, probably exceeding in its
intensity and rivaling in the scope and magnitude of its effects the
advance which has given the label of 'industrial revolution' to the
events of the late 18th and early 19th centuries in England, was
under way. This movement, lowering costs and stimulating pro-ATTRIBUTES OF THE POST-WAR DECADE 557
duction, modifying the returns to producing groups, intensifying
the ills of an old evil—unemployrnent, was to leave a deep impress
on the years which followed.
During this period the working of the system of prices was con-
ditioned by two major changes, one reflecting slowly-acting forces,
the other an aftermath of the sudden shifts of the first post-war
recession. The first of these, an intangible but probably a consid-
erable factor in subsequent developments, was an apparent loss of
flexibility in important elements of the price structure. Heavy in-
vestment in overhead, price regulation, monopolistic and semi-mo-
nopolistic control, trade agreements, changed distributive methods,
emphasis on non-price factors inselling, extensive valorization
efforts—these and other influences tended to render prices a less
sensitive agency for the transmission of economic intelligence, and
to make more difficult that prompt adaptation of individual eco-
nomic elements to changes in other elements which is essential to
the working of a competitive economy. What is especially signifi-
cant about this tendency is that it accompanied changes which tied
together even more intimately the individual elements of the general
industrial structure. Just when greater complexity of the whole
structure and increased interdependence of its component elements
were making more imperative a delicate and continuing adjustment
of working parts, the agency whose function it is to secure mutual
adjtistment and prompt adaptation was, it appears, becoming less
sensitive to change and less efficient as an instrument of coördi-
nation.
The violent movements that accompanied the recession of 1920-
21 had brought sharp alterations in the relations among economic
elements, alterations of a magnitude that might normally have been
expected as a result of years of gradual change. As an earthquake
may elevate some areas and submerge others, so certain economic
elements were suddenly lifted to positions of new power and in-
fluence, while others lost the gains of years. Whether these altera-
tions were such as might later have occurred as a result of slow
evolution is not now in question. What is here notable is that these
pronounced shifts of economic relations occurred over a very short
period, and that no enduring adaptation to them could be promptly
effected. In this sense, then, they were unbalanced changes, and in
this sense the expansion of 1922-29 started with an unstable foun-
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With such a background the striking advance of 1922-29 was
begun. This advance, bounded at the one extreme by a movement
which had profoundly modified pre-war relations among the ele-
ments of the economic system, ended, in 1929, with still more vio-
lent changes impending. The period between constitutes one of the
most promising fiekis of study open to economists. If we are able
properly to interpret this complex experience we may hope to deter-
mine whether anything approaching true economic equilibrium was
achieved within the era bounded by the two great post-war reces-
sions. We may hope, too, to determine more precisely the conditions
that conduce to stable economic processes, and to define more accu-
rately than is now possible the limits of tolerance of the existing
order, in relation to the stresses and strains to which it is exposed.
Both the good and the ill features of this economic experience will
repay analysis and appraisal. The economic insecurity, the marked
inequalities of distribution, the collapse that crowned the expan-
sion we must learn to avoid. But the period brought also increasing
productivity, an expanding volume of production, an advance in
the real rewards of the average man—desirable objectives all, un-
der any economic system. A fruitful lesson concerning the attain-
ment of these objectives is to be learned from the experiences of
the last decade, if we have the wit to profit by them.